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Intrusion upon seclusion
Simon Connell, the University of Otago
asks whether the tort naturally merits exemplary damages
I
n C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, the High Court
found that New Zealand law recognised an actionable
tort of intrusion upon seclusion with the elements: (a) an
intentional and unauthorised intrusion (b) into seclusion (c)
involving infringement of a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy (d) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Exemplary damages are awarded to punish and deter outra-
geous wrongdoing rather than to compensate the plaintiff,
and are available only in cases of advertent wrongdoing
(Couch v Attorney-General [2010] NZSC 27). At first glance,
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion appears almost custom-
made for exemplary damages, since it requires “highly offen-
sive” wrongdoing that is intentional. This note usesC v Holland
to explore whether the tort of intrusion upon seclusion really
is a good match for exemplary damages.
C v HOLLAND
Holland invaded C’s privacy by videoing her while she was
showering. C was showering in the bathroom of a house
owned by Holland and by C’s boyfriend, where Holland had
hidden a recording device in a roof cavity. C and her boy-
friend discovered the recordings and complained to police.
Holland was charged under s 216H of the Crimes Act 1961
(making an intimate visual recording) and after entering a
guilty plea he was convicted, ordered to pay $1,000 in
reparation for emotional harm, and discharged without any
additional penalty.
C brought a civil claim against Holland, arguing that the
Court should extend the principles in Hosking v Runting
[2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA), (2004) 7 RNZ 301, where the Court
of Appeal recognised a tort for invasion of privacy involving
publication of private facts, and recognise a tort of intrusion
upon seclusion. Such a tort is a feature of the law of the
United States (Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) at § 652B)
and has been recently recognised in Canada (Jones v Tsige
2012 ONCA 32.) The High Court noted at [64] that privacy
is linked to personal autonomy and at [67] stated that
privacy’s normative value could not seriously be doubted.
Whata J considered that recognition of a tort of intrusion
upon seclusion was an appropriate expansion of the com-
mon law, and found that New Zealand law recognised such
a tort, with the elements as set out above. As the High Court
concluded, these elements are clearly met on the facts of C
v Holland. The question of damages was left for a later
hearing.
”OUTRAGEOUS”?
For a defendant to have committed the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion, the intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion must be
more than merely inconvenient or offensive, it must be
“highly offensive.” For a court to award exemplary dam-
ages, a defendant’s conduct must be so outrageous that it
demands a response over and above an award of compensa-
tory damages: an additional award of damages to punish the
defendant and deter the kind of behaviour the defendant
engaged in. So, what is the difference between these two
thresholds? The level of wrongdoing required for conduct to
qualify as “outrageous” is clearly higher than “highly offen-
sive”; it is conceivable to have a highly offensive intrusion
into seclusion that is not “outrageous”, but all “outrageous”
intrusions will surely qualify as “highly offensive.” While we
might be able to articulate that there is a difference between
the two thresholds in the abstract, it may prove difficult to
predict whether a particular intrusion upon seclusion is
“outrageous” or merely “highly offensive.”
The facts of the Canadian case Jones v Tsige provide an
example of intrusion upon seclusion where exemplary dam-
age were not awarded. Jones and Tsige worked at different
branches of the same bank. Tsige, who was in a relationship
with Jones’ former husband, used her position as a bank
employee toaccess Jones’ banking informationat least174 times
over a period of four years. The Court of Appeal for Ontario
thought that the case did not exhibit any exceptional quality
calling for exemplary damages. The plaintiff had sought
compensatory damages of C$70, 000 and exemplary dam-
ages of C$20, 000. The Court awarded damages of C$10,
000, in part because Jones had suffered no public embarrass-
ment or harm to her health, welfare, social, business or
financial position.
I suggest that the defendant’s conduct in C v Holland is
more likely to be considered outrageous — though it is by no
means certain that Holland’s conduct is offensive enough to
justify exemplary damages. Holland’s intrusion was into a
private space — the bathroom — that C could reasonably
expect no one to intrude upon, where Tsige accessed infor-
mation that other bank employees could legitimately access.
Furthermore, there is something especially egregious about
making an visual recording of someone showering without
their knowledge or consent — as opposed to, for example,
making a covert recording of a person sitting fully clothed in
their living room. Parliament has recognised this by creating
the offence of making an intimate visual recording. That
brings us to the next point of discussion — the relationship
between exemplary damages and the criminal law.
The criminal and civil law overlap in function. Exemplary
damages and sentences for criminal offending both punish
and deter. Compensatory damages and sentences of repara-
tion both compensate. Not all intrusions upon seclusion will
also qualify as criminal conduct but some, including C v Hol-
land, will. This raises the question as to how exemplary
damages for intrusion upon seclusion could operate given
that the criminal law might already have addressed, or may
address in the future, the tortious conduct in question.
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The Court of Appeal considered the first overlap in Daniels
v Thompson [1998] 3 NZLR 22. In that case, a majority
found that the civil law should always defer to the criminal
law in matters of punishment and deterrence — to do other-
wise could result in double punishment. Thus, where a party
has been convicted and criminal sanctions have been applied,
exemplary damages should not be available. Civil proceed-
ings should be stayed if there is a possibility of a criminal
prosecution, and only go ahead if it is clear that there will be
no prosecution. Finally, in cases where a person has been
acquitted of criminal charges relating to certain acts, there
should be no award of exemplary damages.
In a clear rejection of Daniels v Thompson, Parliament
amended the accident compensation legislation to state that
a court can make an award of exemplary damages even
though a defendant has been charged with or acquitted of a
criminal offence, or has not been charged with such an
offence. In addition, if a defendant has already been penalised
for its conduct, the court may take this into account (Acci-
dent Compensation Act 2001, s 319.) However, this only
applies to victims of personal injury covered by the ACC
scheme. In a case like C v Holland, where the plaintiff is the
victim of a criminal offence but has no covered injury under
the ACC scheme, the High Court is arguably bound to apply
Daniels v Thompson and decline to award exemplary dam-
ages, regardless of the outrageousness of the defendant’s
conduct.
This significantly limits the potential for successful claims
for exemplary damages in cases of intrusion upon seclusion.
Some of the most outrageous intrusions upon seclusion may
well already be caught by the criminal law. This might create
a disincentive for victims to report such conduct to police, so
as to avoid prejudicing a civil claim for exemplary damages
— an undesirable outcome. That, plus the anomaly of Daniels
v Thompson applying to some victims of crime and not
others, might cause Parliament — or perhaps the Court of
Appeal, if it gets the opportunity — to do away with Daniels
v Thompson for all cases of exemplary damages. C v Hol-
land, or a case like it, could well be the catalyst for such a
development.
Suppose that Daniels v Thompson does not apply, and the
court hearing the case is satisfied that Holland’s behaviour
was outrageous. The court hearing the case is then put in the
unenviable position of second-guessing in a civil case the
sentence applied in a criminal proceeding while avoiding this
kind of situation is one of the reasons the majority in Daniels
v Thompson decided the case the way that it did. It does seem
possible that a court might conclude that the combination of
the $1, 000 reparation and conviction were not sufficient to
punish Holland’s behaviour, deter others from doing the
same, and show society’s disapproval of covertly recording C
while she was showering. If so, an award of exemplary
damages would mean Holland’s conduct received a fuller
response.
COMPENSATION
Although it is made in the context of criminal sentencing,
the primary purpose of an order of reparation is com-
pensation (Police v Ferrier HC Auckland CRI 2003-404-
00195, 18 November 2003). Unlike civil awards of
compensatory damages, reparation is subject to an impor-
tant limiting factor: the financial capacity of the offender.
The usual presumption in favour of reparation is lifted
if an award would result in undue hardship for the
offender (Sentencing Act 2002, s 12(1)). In R v Bailey
CA306/03, 10 May 2004, the Court of Appeal stated
at [25] that reparation “must be set at a level which makes
it realistic given the financial circumstances of the offender”.
A sentence of reparation does not, however, affect the right
of the victim to pursue full compensation by recovering
additional damages by civil proceedings (s 38(2)).
Damages for intrusion upon seclusion and reparation for
emotional harm both compensate slightly different intan-
gible losses. The High Court may consider that the $1,000
that Holland was ordered to pay C is also sufficient compen-
sation for the breach of privacy; or, the High Court may
consider the $1,000 inadequate and award an additional
amountofcompensatorydamages.Additionaldamages,whether
compensatory or exemplary, may be futile if Holland does
not have the ability to pay — which may well be the case if
the reparation was set at $1,000 because of his financial
capacity. This provides a further limiting factor on potential
claims for exemplary damages for intrusion upon seclusion:
finding a defendant with the ability to pay. The search for
deeper pockets naturally leads to the question of vicarious
liability.
One can imagine a variation on the facts of C v Holland
where the defendant did not own the home, but was a
building superintendent hired to maintain the building, or, a
variation on the facts of Jones v Tsige where a government
department is substituted for the bank. Would the employer,
or the Crown, be vicarious liable? With respect to vicarious
liability for compensatory damages, there may be room to
argue that an intrusion upon seclusion falls outside the scope
of employment and accordingly there is no liability. Vicari-
ous liability for exemplary damages, which would mean
punishing the principal for the wrongdoing of the agent,
seems unlikely (although S v Attorney General [2003] 3 NZLR
450 (CA) at [93] and Hobson v Attorney-General [2007]
1 NZLR 374 (CA) at [153] suggest vicarious liability for
exemplary damages might be appropriate in extraordinary
circumstances.)
CONCLUSION
At first glance, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion appears a
promising candidate for exemplary damages. Two difficult
hurdles have to be jumped before an award of exemplary
damages can be made: the wrongdoing must be (i) advertent
and (ii) outrageous. These correspond almost perfectly with
elements of the tort. However, upon closer examination,
major difficulties arise. Although it is clear that not all
“highly offensive” conduct is “outrageous” enough for exem-
plary damages, further elucidation of the distinction is diffi-
cult. C v Holland potentially re-opens the nasty wound of
Daniels v Thompson, which, unless overturned, limits the
potential for successful claims for exemplary damages for
intrusion upon seclusion. A further limit on such successful
claims is finding a defendant with deep pockets — which in
turn raises difficult questions of vicarious liability. Intrusion
upon seclusion and exemplary damages are not a match
made in heaven after all. r
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